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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
LA MAR PEAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO 
C[TY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body 
corporate and politic, and MERRILL 
CHRISTOPHERSON, RAY MUR-
DOCK, SHIRLEY PAXMAN, WIL-
FORD E. SMITH, an d LAMAR 
EMPEY, members of said Board, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9722 
APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully answers the 
Defendants' -Respondents' Petition for Rehearing in the 
above entitled case as follows : 
POINT I 
The Supreme Court is not bound by the "executive" 
and ''administrative" interpretation that has occurred 
regarding Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961 
in the definition of the word "electors." 
POINT II 
The Supre1ne Court's construction of Section 11, 
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah was proper in holding that 
electors must meet certain property requirements. 
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POINT III 
The Court should not consider in a Petition for Re-
hearing points that could have been brought up in the 
original hearing or were expressly abandoned in the 
original hearing. 
POINT IV 
The Court correctly decided that the notice given 
by the School Board as required by the statute was 
ambiguous and insufficient to appraise the voting public 
of the issues of the election. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 1963. 
NIELSEN, CONDER & HANSEN 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
FRANKLIN D .. JOHNSON 
MORGAN & PAYNE 
J. RULON MORGAN 
Atto.rneys for PlaintVff-Appellant 
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BRIEF IX SlTPPORT OF ANSWER TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE "EX-
ECUTIVE" AND "ADMINISTRATIVE" INTERPRETATION 
THAT HAS OCCURRED REGARDING SECTION 11, CHAP-
ER 104, LAWS OF UTAH, 1961 IN THE DEFINITION OF 
THE WORD "ELECTORS." 
The Petitioners-Respondents agree that the Supreme 
Court is not neces.sariJly bound by executive or admin-
istrative interpretation of statutes (See Petitioners' 
Brief for Rehearing, p. 4), but they divine in the present 
case that the Court gave no consideration to the execu-
tive and administrative interpretation. We are at a loss 
to determine how this conclusion was reached, unless 
the asstunption was made that because the Supreme 
Court's decision was different than the school boards' 
and the Attorney General's the Court disregarded their 
decisions completely. The refusal to adopt a position 
does not 1nean tlw t the position received no considera-
tion. The fact that the present case was argued before 
the Court and a brief submitted thereon by the school 
board must at least implicitly mean that the Supreme 
Court considered their interpretation. 
The Supreme Court is not bound by the previous 
decision of these bodies in the interpretation of the 
present statute. Justice Frankfurter in "Some Reflec-
tions on the ~leanings of Statutes." 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 
536-37 (19-l-7) presents an interesting dichotomy in the 
proper approach to the interpretation of statutes. He 
says: 
•· ... If a statute is written for ordinary folk, 
it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress 
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intended its words to be read with the minds of 
ordinary men. If they are addressed to specalists, 
they must he read by judges with the minds of 
specialists." 
In the statute before the ·Court the word that is in 
need of clarification is "electors." It seems absurd to 
think that the school boards are in a better position to 
interpret this word than the courts. The expertise of 
a school board is of little value in interpreting a word 
of such legal and historical meaning. In fact it would 
seem that the school boards have a built-in bias in inter-
preting the word "electors." They would logically choose 
an interpretation that would tend to favor their own 
position in a leeway election. And it follows that an 
"elector" with no property qualifications would be more 
prone to vote for an increase in property taxes than an 
"elector" with property. It is fair to let the school 
boards raise their interpretation to the Court for its 
consideration, which the Court has done·, but then the 
Court n1ust decide which interpretation is to stand. 
Judge L.earned Hand in F:ishgold v. St"lli'van D.rydock & 
Repair Co., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946) aff'd. 328 U. S. 
275 (1946) said this regarding the possible bias of admin-
istrative agencies : 
"We do not forget that the cannon which the 
plaintiff invokes is not confined to decisions inter 
partes, like those of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 
Labor Board, or the Tax Court; it extends also 
to the interpretations of officials charged with 
the duty of enforcing statutes. Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 32·3 U. S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161; Great Northern 
R. Go. v. United States, 315 U S. 262, 62 S.Ct. 
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5:2~), 86 L.Ed. 836. Whether the weight to be given 
to such rulings is less than to regulations for the 
conduct of, or decisions in, contested cases, has 
never been expressly decided, though it was in-
timated in Skidmore v. Swift, supra, 323 U.S. at 
page 139, 65 S.Ct. at page 164; and see Judge 
Frank's dissent in Duquesne Warehouse v. Rail-
road Retirement Board, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 473, 485-
487. There is indeed a basis for making such a 
distinction because the position of a public officer 
charged with the enforcement of a law is dif-
ferent from one who must decide a dispute. If 
there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the 
case for the side which he represents, and leave 
derision to the court, or the administrative tri-
bunal, upon which lies the responsibility of deci-
sion. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it 
will, at least it may, be surrendered forever; and 
yet it may be right. Since such rulings need not 
have the detachment of a judicial or semi-judicial 
decision, and may properly carry a bias, it would 
seem that they should not be as authoritative; 
and of this sort were the rulings of the Director 
and the Attorney General in the case at bar, unlike 
the decisions of the War Labor Board and the 
direction of the Solicitor of the Labor Depart-
ment." 
Another factor not consi~ered by the Petitioners 
is the inaction of the Utah $tate Legislature to correct 
the interpretations made by the Supreme Court. The 
decision now under consideration was published expedi-
tiously by the Court in time for consideration by the 
recent session of the Utah Legislature, and the Legisla-
ture did nothing to correct what the Petitioners feel is 
an obvious error. The inaction of the Legislature would 
tend to confirm the Court's decision as to the intent 
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of the statute, especially in light of the fact that the 
case has aroused the interest of no less than four othe-r 
school boards who have filed amici curiae briefs. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SEC-
TION 11, CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF UTAH WAS PROPER 
IN HOLDING THAT ELECTORS MUST MEET CERTAIN 
PROPERY REQUIREMENTS. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where 
a Petition for Rehearing presents nothing new and im-
portant it will be refused. See Ducheneau v. House, 4 U. 
483, 11 P. 618 (1886),Jones v. House, 4 U. 484, 11 P. 619 
( 1886). And also where the Court has not misconstrued 
or overlooked some material facts and not overlooked 
some statute or decision nor applied an improper prin-
ciple of law that caused the Court to reach an improper 
decision, the Court will deny a Petition for Rehearing. 
Cumm~"ngs v. Nielsen, 42 U. 157, 129 P. 619 (1913). The 
Petitioners have not presented any proper new or over-
looked matters, nor have they presented any decisions 
or improper consideration of the Court that would en-
title this case to be reheard. 
In light of the above, and the fact that we could add 
nothing to what has already been presented to the Court 
on this point, we feel it would be redundant to offer 
further cases to substantiate the present position of 
the Court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER IN A PETI-
TION FOR REHEARING POINTS THAT COULD HAVE 
BEEN BROUGHT UP IN THE ORIGINAL HEARING OR 
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WERE EXPRESSLY ABANDONED IN THE ORIGINAL 
HEARING. 
Petitioner on page 4 of his original brief before 
the Supreme Court stated: 
"Issue number (2) above, is the questioned 
statute unconstitutional because it requires no 
property qualification of electors voting on the 
proposition, was argued extensively before the 
trial court. It is not cited by appellant here as a 
ground for reversal, nor is this point argued. We, 
therefore, take it to be abandoned on this appeal 
and shall not belabor the question further." 
The Supreme ·Court has repeatedly ruled that points 
cannot be raised on rehearing that could have been 
raised in the original hearing by the briefs and oral 
argument. In re Lowe's Est.ate, 68 U. 49, 249 P. 128 
(1926). In this particular case the Petitioners-Respon-
dents and the Appellant expressly abandoned this con-
stitutional issue, and it is not proper to let it be raised 
at this time in the Petition for Rehearing. The Petitioner 
has not raised this constitutional issue in his petition, 
hut the A1nici Curiae's Petition raises it in Point I.B 
of their petition and argues it extensively. The Amici 
Curiae should not be entitled to a privilege that is denied 
the original parties to the litigation, and therefore the 
Court should not consider their newly raised issue of 
constitutionality on this point. See Barnes v. Lehi City, 
7± F. 321, 279 P. 878 (1929) wherein the Court held 
that the Amicus Curiae was not entitled to a rehearing 
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The Petitioners-Respondents and the Amici Curiae 
argue extensively that the Court should have required 
a showing that sufficient invalid votes were cast to 
change the election results before invalidating the elec-
tion. See Petitioners' Brief, page 8, and Amici Curiae's 
Brief, page 23. This point was not presented at the 
original hearing nor was it even presented in the trial 
court, and therefore cannot be relied upon in the Peti-
tion for Rehearing as ground for reversal. See In Re 
Lowe's Estate, supra; Harrison v. Ha,rber, 44 U. 541, 
142 P. 716 (1914); Swanson V. s~"ms, 51 u. 485, 170 P. 
774 (1918); Dahlquist v. Denver and R.G.R. Co. 52 U. 
438, 174 P. 833 (1918). 
The reason for the above rule is obvious, and its 
application in the present case is essential. The parties 
concerned were aware of this argument, and could have 
brought up the issues they now wish to present to the 
Court at the original hearing. They have had their day, 
and should not be allowed to string out the litigation 
ad infinitum by holding back points that could easily 
have been presented in the original hearing. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THE NO-
TICE GIVEN BY THE SCHOOL BOARD AS REQUIRED BY 
THE STATUTE WAS AMBIGUOUS AND INSUFFICIENT 
TO APPRAISE THE VOTING PUBLIC OF THE ISSUES OF 
THE ELECTION. 
This point has already been argued extensively, and 
we do not wish to raise any new authorities or argu-
ment than what we have already presented. We would 
like, however, to call to the attention of the Court the 
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fact that not only was the notice given to the public 
dPI'ectivP, but that the final authorization of the school 
board to aet upon the affirmative vote of the people 
was tied to the ambiguous term "minimum basic pro-
gram." Both the Petitioners-Respondents and the Amici 
Curiae give the public powers of comprehension not 
possessed by the school board itself in framing the actual 
issues of the election. Amici Curiae's Brief p. 33, Peti-
tioner's Brief, p. 15. 
Perhaps it is true that the public is not easily misled, 
but it is at least entitled to the protection of having the 
P~~ential facts placed before it so that an educated deci-
sion might be made. It is too much for them to have 
to rely on the idea that right will be done-they should 
be allowed to :know exactly for what they are· asked to 
vote. 
CONCLUSION 
It is regrettable that a law that affects so many 
people suffers such obvious defects, and that it requires 
the necessity of such extensive clarification by the Su-
preme Court. It is also regrettable that the election held 
b~· the Board of Education of the Provo ·City School 
District did not meet the requirements of the act. But 
such acts and interpretations are within the purview 
of the judiciary, and the Court has properly undertaken 
the task of shedding light on what is admittedly a very 
clouded problem. The very fact, however, that the ques-
tion under decision affects so many makes the decision, 
whichever way it is decided, important. Defendants-
Respondents infer the Court is placing catastrophe be-
fore the school boards and inviting a "plethora of liti-
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gation," and perhaps this is true. The Courts, however, 
also o·we a duty to the public at large and to the legis-
lature to interpret the statute before it and to rectify 
any improper acts in its administration. The fact that 
it is inconvenient to the school boards perhaps makes 
the Court's decision less pleasurefull but it makes it 
none the less necessary. 
We respectfully submit that the Court has already 
decided the present case, and that no compelling reason 
has been presented for it to change its position, and 
therefore we ask the Court to deny the Petition for 
Rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
ARTI-IUR H. NIELSEN 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MORGAN AND PAYNE 
J. RULON MORGAN 
128 East Center 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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